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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to provide an account of the epistemology
and metaphysics of universe creation on a computer. The paper begins
with F.J.Tipler’s argument that our experience is indistinguishable from
the experience of someone embedded in a perfect computer simulation of
our own universe, hence we cannot know whether or not we are part of
such a computer program ourselves. Tipler’s argument is treated as a
special case of epistemological scepticism, in a similar vein to ‘brain-in-
a-vat’ arguments. It is argued that the hypothesis that our universe is
a program running on a digital computer in another universe generates
empirical predictions, and is therefore a falsifiable hypothesis. The com-
puter program hypothesis is also treated as a hypothesis about what exists
beyond the physical world, and is compared with Kant’s metaphysics of
noumena. It is proposed that a theory about what exists beyond the
physical world should be formulated with the precise concepts of mathe-
matics, and should generate physical predictions. It is argued that if our
universe is a program running on a digital computer, then our universe
must have compact spatial topology, and the possibilities of observation-
ally testing this prediction are considered. The possibility of testing the
computer program hypothesis with the value of the density parameter Ω0
is also analysed. The informational requirements for a computer to repre-
sent a universe exactly and completely are considered. Consequent doubt
is thrown upon Tipler’s claim that if a hierarchy of computer universes
exists, we would not be able to know which ‘level of implementation’ our
universe exists at. It is then argued that a digital computer simulation
of a universe cannot exist as a universe. However, the paper concludes
with the acknowledgement that an analog computer simulation can be
objectively related to the thing it represents, hence an analog computer
simulation of a universe could, in principle, exist as a universe.
Keywords: Computer Cosmology Creation Scepticism Information En-
tropy
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1 The epistemology of universe creation on a
computer
F.J.Tipler has suggested that our universe could be a computer program running
on a computer in another universe, (see, for example, p240-244 of Tipler 1989,
and p206-209 of Tipler 1995). Tipler imagines a perfect computer simulation of
our universe, which precisely matches the evolution in time of our own universe,
and precisely represents every property of every entity in our universe. Such a
simulation would simulate all the people who exist in our own universe. Such
simulated people, suggests Tipler, would reflect upon the fact that they think,
would interact with their apparent environment, and would conclude that they
exist. Their experience would be indistinguishable from our own experience,
and Tipler infers from this that we ourselves cannot know that we are not part
of such a computer program. Ex hypothesi, there is nothing in our experience
which could be evidence that we are not part of such a program, hence, it might
be argued, we cannot know that we are not part of a computer program.
This argument is a type of epistemological scepticism, similar to Descartes’
dreaming argument. Descartes raised the possibility that one could experience
a dream which is indistinguishable from the experience of a conscious, waking
individual. The sceptical argument from this is that, ex hypothesi, there is
nothing in one’s experience which could be evidence that one is not dreaming,
hence one cannot know that one is not dreaming.
A modern version of this is the ‘brain in a vat’ hypothesis. Jonathan Dancy
characterises this sceptical hypothesis as follows: “You do not know that you
are not a brain in a vat full of liquid in a laboratory, and wired to a computer
which is feeding you your current experiences under the control of some inge-
nious technician/scientist...For if you were such a brain, then, provided that the
scientist is successful, nothing in your experience could possibly reveal that you
were; for your experience is ex hypothesi identical with that of something which
is not a brain in a vat. Since you have only your own experience to appeal to,
and that experience is the same in either situation, nothing can reveal to you
which situation is the actual one,” (Dancy 1985, p10).
One can identify two distinct premises in this argument:
(a). It is possible for a brain in a vat to be fed experience of an illusional world.
(b). It is possible for that experience to be indistinguishable from our own
experience.
From these premises, the reasoning is as follows: Because the experience of
the illusional world would be indistinguishable from one’s own experience, it is
not possible to know whether or not one’s own experience is experience of a real
world, or experience of an illusional world fed to a brain in a vat. Hence, it is
not possible to know whether or not one is a brain in a vat.
There is, however, a vital ambiguity in the argument. There are two different
senses in which real world experience could be indistinguishable from illusional
world experience. One could claim either of the following two propositions:
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1. The experience of the illusional world would be indistinguishable from the
real world in terms of the detailed content of the experience.
2. The experience of the illusional world would be indistinguishable as expe-
rience from experience of the real world. In other words, the form of the
illusory experience would be indistinguishable from the form of real-world
experience.
It is not clear which of these claims Dancy is making. To illustrate the
differences between these claims, consider the following scenarios:
Firstly, suppose that an individual is born in the real world, grows-up in the
real world, and experiences the real world for 30 years, developing a range of cog-
nitive skills, and accumulating a large collection of memories. Then, one night,
whilst he lies asleep, the individual is unknowingly drugged and kidnapped by a
scientist. As the victim lies unconscious in the scientist’s laboratory, his brain is
removed and wired up to a computer. When the individual is allowed to recover
consciousness, he wakes up to experience an illusional world controlled by the
computer. Suppose that the individual retains his memories of the real world.
To prevent the individual from having a reason to believe that he is a brain
in a vat, the experience of the illusional world must be indistinguishable from
the individual’s experience of the real world. Both the form and the detailed
content of the individual’s illusory experience must be indistinguishable from
his experience of the real world. The illusional world must have the same spatial
layout and the same apparent history as that part of the real world known to
the victim, and the illusional world must evolve according to the same laws that
operate in the real world. The victim must feel that he experiences his world,
and influences events in his world, with the same body that he possessed before
he fell asleep the previous night. The victim must not recognize any difference
between the real world and the illusional world that is not explicable by the
laws of the real world. The victim must appear to perceive the same world he
perceived before he fell asleep the previous night.
If these conditions were satisfied, then the individual would have no justifi-
cation for believing that he is a brain in a vat. In accordance with conventional
definitions of knowledge, if the individual would not be justified in believing
that he is a brain in a vat, then he could not know that he is a brain in a vat.
It is possible to imagine other sceptical scenarios which do not require the
detailed nature of the illusional world to be indistinguishable from the detailed
nature of the real world. If an individual’s memories of the real world are deleted
or suppressed, and apparent memories of an illusional world completely different
from the real world are added, then experience of the illusional world would not
give the individual reason to believe that he experiences an illusional world.
The individual could experience an illusional world with a spatial layout and
history totally different to the spatial layout and history of the real world. The
illusional world could operate according to laws different to those that operate
in the real world. Nevertheless, the experience of the illusional world would
be indistinguishable, as experience, from experience of the real world. In other
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words, the form of the illusory experience, if not the detailed content, would be
indistinguishable from real-world experience.
To take another example, if an individual were fed illusory experiences from
birth, that individual would have no memories of the real world. Hence, ex-
perience of an illusory world completely different from the real world in terms
of detailed content, would not give the individual reason to believe that he
experiences an illusional world.
It is not necessary to suppose that the individual who experiences an illu-
sional world is an unwilling participant. It is possible, for example, that one’s
entire lifetime of experience upon 20th/21st century Earth, is part of a virtual
reality game, played on a distant planet in the far-future. The technology of
the far-future might enable game-players to play any role, in any factual or fic-
titious world. The game technology might suppress one’s real-world memories,
and supply the memories of the character one is playing. If the game technol-
ogy suppressed one’s real-world memories, one would be unaware of playing a
virtual reality game. The game technology might even suppress one’s real-world
cognitive skills; one might experience birth, growth and mental development in
the game world. Either way, one would have no memory of deciding to enter the
game world. Once again, the sceptical argument is that one’s own experience is
indistinguishable from the experience of someone playing such a virtual reality
game, hence one cannot know whether or not one is playing such a game.
Those sceptical arguments which require the detailed nature of the illusional
world to be indistinguishable from the detailed nature of the real world, share a
common point of vulnerability. It is possible for the hypothesis supporting such
sceptical arguments to be false, and it is possible to know that it is false.
If the detailed content of the illusory experience is indistinguishable from
the detailed content of real experience, then one can infer facts about the real
world from one’s experience, irrespective of whether one’s experience is illusory
or not. This allows one to determine, by scientific investigation, whether the
hypothesis which supports the sceptical argument, is true or false.
For example, consider the brain in a vat argument. Recall that this sceptical
argument is based upon the premise that it is possible for a brain in a vat to
be fed experience of an illusional world. Because the illusional world would
be indistinguishable, by hypothesis, from the real world, one’s sensory systems
and neurophysiology in the illusional world would be the same as one’s sensory
systems and neurophysiology in the real world. Hence, one could learn about
one’s real world physiology and neurology from one’s experience, irrespective
of whether one’s experience is experience of the real world, or the illusional
experience of a brain in a vat. One could not be led into forming false beliefs
about the kind of entity one is without the violation of the indistinguishability
condition.
Investigation of the human brain may reveal that it is impossible for it to
be stimulated in a way which would produce experience indistinguishable from
the experience of a person who is not a brain in a vat. Thus, the hypothesis
upon which the sceptical argument is based, could be false. If one knew from
neurophysiology that it is not possible for one to be a brain in a vat, then
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one would know that one is not a brain in a vat. When Dancy characterises
the sceptical argument he states that “you have only your own experience to
appeal to,” (Dancy 1985, p10). This is false because one can also appeal to
one’s scientific understanding, based upon both theory and empirical evidence.
The other sceptical scenarios share this vulnerability: neurophysiological
investigation of the brain could reveal that it is not possible for dreams to
be indistinguishable from the experiences of a waking individual; research in
micro-electronics, computer science, and human physiology, might conclude that
totally authentic virtual reality is not possible.
Those sceptical arguments which do not require the detailed nature of the
illusional world to be indistinguishable from the detailed nature of the real world,
are more robust. If the detailed nature of the illusional world is different from
the detailed nature of the real world, then one cannot necessarily learn about
real world physiology and neurology from illusory experience. However, these
more robust sceptical scenarios are dependent upon the following premise:
• Either it is possible to delete or suppress an individual’s memories of the
real world, and to replace them with apparent memories of an illusional
world, or it is possible to feed an individual with illusory experience from
birth.
If this premise is false, then all the sceptical arguments which concern illu-
sional worlds might be refuted by empirical investigation. It is, however, difficult
to establish whether this premise is true or false. If scientific investigation re-
veals that it is impossible in our world to feed an individual illusory experiences
from birth, and that it is impossible in our world to delete or suppress an in-
dividual’s memories, and replace them with apparent memories of an illusional
world, then this alone does not establish whether the premise is true or false. If
our world is an illusional world, and if the detailed nature of the illusional world
is different from the real world, then scientific discoveries about our world, the
illusional world, do not tell us anything about the real world.
It has been assumed in this section that it is possible to make a distinction
between the form and content of experience. If such a distinction is not possible,
then the sceptical scenarios must be re-categorised as follows:
1. An individual in our world experiences an illusional world which is indis-
tinguishable from experience of our world. The individual is unaware that
his experience is illusional precisely because the illusional experience is
indistinguishable from experience of our world.
2. An individual in our world experiences an illusional world which is distin-
guishable from experience of our world. The individual is unaware of the
difference, either because his memories of our world have been deleted or
suppressed, or because he has experienced the illusional world from birth.
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In case 1 the sceptical argument is as before, with the reference to the con-
tent of experience omitted. In case 2, the sceptical argument is as follows: If
an individual in our world could experience an illusional world which is distin-
guishable from experience of our world, and if that individual could be made
unaware that what he experiences is illusional, then our own world experience
could be illusional experience, distinguishable from the real world. We cannot
know whether or not our experience is experience of the real world, or experience
of an illusional world different from the real world.
The computer program hypothesis differs in one respect from the brain-in-
a-vat type of hypothesis. The latter hypothesis suggests that an individual in
a real world could be fed experiences of an illusional world, a world that does
not objectively exist. The computer program hypothesis suggests that an entire
universe could be created as a computer program, and that many individuals
could be created as part of the program. This hypothesis does not merely
suggest that there is a computer program which is feeding illusory experiences to
individuals who exist in a real world. Instead, individuals capable of experience
are themselves created by the program, and the world they experience is just
as real relative to them, as our world is relative to us. It is not Tipler’s claim
that we cannot know whether or not our world is an illusional world. Instead,
he claims that “we cannot know if the universe in which we find ourselves is
actually ultimate reality,” (Tipler 1995, p208). Tipler’s claim is that we cannot
know what level of reality we experience; that we cannot know whether or not
the universe we experience has been created on a computer existing in another
universe.
However, the hypothesis that our own universe is indistinguishable from a
universe created on a computer, may be false. It will be demonstrated in this
paper that physical predictions follow from the hypothesis that our universe
is a program running on a digital computer. For example, it follows that the
structure of the universe must be discrete, and that the spatial universe must
be compact. If these predictions are found to be false, then it is impossible for
our universe to be a program running on a digital computer. If the predictions
are falsified, then our universe is distinguishable from a universe created on
a digital computer. Alternatively, if these predictions are found to be true,
then it remains possible for our universe to be a program running on a digital
computer. Empirical investigation is necessary to determine if the computer
program hypothesis is possible.
2 The metaphysics of universe creation on a
computer
The hypothesis that our universe is a program running on a computer in another
universe is not merely a sceptical epistemological hypothesis, but a metaphysical
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hypothesis, in the sense defined below.
The term ‘metaphysics’ seems to have at least two different meanings. On
the one hand, it is the study of that which possibly exists beyond the physical
world. On the other hand, it is a whole group of philosophical subjects, such as
the studies of time, causation, substance, and universals. These subjects seem
to be united by the fact that they involve very general, foundational study of
the nature of things.1
For the purpose of this paper, metaphysics is defined to be the study of
that which possibly exists beyond the empirically detectable world. In contrast,
physics is defined to be the study of the empirically detectable world. The
hypothesis that our universe is a program running on a computer in another
universe, is clearly a metaphysical hypothesis, in the very specific sense defined
here. The hypothesis is that the computer hardware on which the program is
running cannot be empirically detected by the beings represented in the soft-
ware, hence the hypothesis is metaphysical rather than physical.
It is important to distinguish Tipler’s hypothesis from a metaphysically dis-
tinct proposal made by J.D.Barrow. Barrow suggests that “If we were to regard
the Universe as a vast computer...then we can readily envisage the laws of Na-
ture as some form of software which runs upon the particular forms of matter
that form the world of strings and elementary particles,” (Barrow 1991, p160).
In Tipler’s computer program hypothesis, the computer hardware is inacces-
sible to the people represented in the computer program; the constituents of
matter, elementary particles or not, are just as much a part of the program
software as the laws of physics. Presumably, each different type of particle or
field would correspond to a different data type in the program. Each individual
particle or field would then correspond to an instance of the relevant data type.
In programming parlance, an instance of a data type is called a data object.
Hence, the constituents of matter would correspond to data objects defined in
the program. The laws of physics would correspond to the algorithms which
act upon the data objects defined in the program. In general, entities would
correspond to data objects in a computer program, and processes would corre-
spond to algorithms. For example, an individual electron would correspond to
a data object, and the Dirac equation would correspond to an algorithm capa-
ble of acting upon any electron data object. To give another example, in the
geometrodynamical formulation of general relativity, a 3-manifold Σ, and the
tensor fields (γi,Ki, φi) representing the intrinsic geometry γi, extrinsic geome-
try Ki, and matter fields φi at time i, would all correspond to data objects. The
geometrodynamical evolution process would correspond to an algorithm which
calculates (γj+1,Kj+1, φj+1) from (γj ,Kj , φj).
1The historical reasons for the double-meaning can be traced to Aristotle, as Barry Smith
explains: “The books of Aristotle’s Physics deal with material entities. His Metaphysics
(literally ‘what comes after the Physics’), on the other hand, deals with what is beyond or
behind the physical world - with immaterial entities - and thus contains theology as its most
prominent part. At the same time, however, Aristotle conceives this ‘metaphysics’ as having
as its subject matter all beings, or rather being as such. Metaphysics is accordingly identified
also as ‘first philosophy’, since it deals with the most basic principles upon which all other
sciences rest,” (Smith 1995, p373).
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After suggesting that our universe could be a computer program running on
a computer in another universe, Tipler goes one step further, and claims that
there is no need for a computer to be running the program. The state of memory
of a digital computer can be treated as a long string of binary digits, and this
represents a natural number in binary notation. Given that a computer program
maps an initial memory state to a final memory state, a computer program can
be treated as a mapping on the set of natural numbers. Tipler duly treats a
program as an abstract mapping N→ N, and claims that “if time were to exist
globally, and if the most basic things in the physical universe and the time steps
between one instant and the next were discrete,” (Tipler 1995, p208), then our
universe could be in one-to-one correspondence with such an abstract object.
Tipler acknowledges that the most basic things in the physical universe could be
continuous, hence he proposes a further generalization of what a simulation is:
“Let us say that a perfect simulation exists if the physical universe can be put
into one-to-one correspondence with some mutually consistent subcollection of
all mathematical concepts,” (ibid., p209).
This proposal does not merely suppose that mathematical Platonism is true,
that mathematical objects exist independently of the physical universe, in an
abstract realm. Nor does it merely suppose that physical objects possess in-
trinsic mathematical properties. Instead, it supposes that physical objects can
be identified with mathematical objects. As Barrow puts it, “We exist in the
Platonic realm,” (Barrow 1992, p282). Whilst this is a fascinating idea, I shall
restrict the discussion in this paper to the hypothesis that our universe is a
program running on a computer in another universe.
The notion that there is something which exists beyond the empirically de-
tectable world has famous precedents in the history of philosophy. Various types
of thing have been postulated to exist beyond the physical world: mental enti-
ties, theological entities, and mathematical entities. These types of metaphysical
suggestion are of no relevance to this paper. Rather, the focus of attention is
the metaphysical hypothesis that there is something non-mental, non-deistic,
and non-mathematical, which exists beyond our physical world. For example,
Kant proposed that there are things-in-themselves, so-called ‘noumena’, which
exist beyond the empirically accessible world. The metaphysics of the computer
program hypothesis can be compared with the metaphysics of Kant’s noumena.
To recall, Kant suggested that there is a distinction between noumena and
phenomena. The noumena are things in themselves, and the phenomena are the
appearances of things in sensory perception. There are three possible ways of
defining noumena. The noumena could be things which exist independently of
sensory perception, they could be things which exist independently of empirical
detectability, or they could be things which exist independently of cognition al-
together. Obviously, things which exist independently of empirical detectability
also exist independently of sensory perception, and things which exist indepen-
dently of cognition also exist independently of empirical detectability.
If one merely stipulates that noumena are things which exist independently
of sensory perception, then noumena could simply be things which are too small
to see, like atoms and electrons. Things which are too small to see are still empir-
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ically detectable. As a classic example, an electron leaves a luminescent trail in
a Wilson Cloud Chamber. The electron is not directly perceivable, but it is nev-
ertheless detectable. Kant seems to suggest that noumena exist independently
of both sense perception and empirical detectability of any kind. Further, Kant
seems to hold that noumena are beyond cognition altogether. The computer
program hypothesis holds that the states and processes of the computer in an-
other universe, exist beyond both sense perception and empirical detectability,
but these states and processes are not beyond cognition. What exists beyond
the physical world is conceivable, according to the computer program hypothe-
sis. In contrast, Kant seems to hold that we cannot even conceive what things
in themselves are like.
The computer program hypothesis is consistent with a threefold distinction
between the phenomenal, the physical, and the metaphysical. This corresponds
to the distinction between appearance, physical reality, and metaphysical real-
ity. Appearances and phenomena consist of sensory experiences such as colours,
sounds, and smells. Physical reality is the world described by physics, the world
of atoms, electrons, and space-time. The hypothetical metaphysical reality con-
sists of the states and processes of a computer in another universe. In this
threefold distinction, space and time exist independently of sensory appear-
ances, whereas Kant believed that space and time are merely the format into
which sensory experience is arranged. Unlike Kant, the proposal in this paper
will not relegate space-time to the merely phenomenal.
The computer program hypothesis is an interesting case because the global
metaphysics is drawn from local physics. The nature of what lies beyond the
entire physical universe (global metaphysics) is drawn from the nature of the
computer, a part of the physical world (local physics).
This paper proposes that, in general, the relationship between metaphysics
and physics should be similar to the relationship between topology and geome-
try. A particular topology constrains the possible geometry, but is, nevertheless,
consistent with a range of different geometries. For example, given the topology
of the n-sphere Sn, it is impossible for the geometry to be flat, but there are,
nevertheless, many possible geometries on Sn with non-zero curvature. Topol-
ogy has implications for geometry, but a particular topology does not entail a
unique geometry. Similarly, a metaphysical theory should, at the very least,
have implications for the physical world. A metaphysical model should con-
strain the possible physical models, but a metaphysical model should not entail
a unique physical model. In general, a metaphysical model should be consistent
with a range of different physical models.
Conversely, it is not possible to infer a unique topology from geometrical
properties like sectional curvature. Similarly, it is not possible to infer a unique
metaphysical model from a physical model. However, geometrical properties
do have topological implications, and similarly, the theories of physics do have
metaphysical implications.
The computer program hypothesis developed in this paper exemplifies these
proposed standards for a metaphysical theory. Properly developed, the hypothe-
sis makes predictions about the physical universe. The metaphysical hypothesis
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that our universe is a program running on a digital computer entails that
• The universe is discrete
• The solutions to the fundamental evolution equations of physics must be
computable functions
• The spatial universe has compact topology
These predictions are empirically testable, hence the metaphysical computer
program hypothesis is empirically testable. It will be demonstrated that the
computer program hypothesis might be verifiable or falsifiable by astronomical
observation. None of the predictions above will be invalidated by the devel-
opment of quantum computers. Although quantum computers might be able
to perform certain calculations faster than computers based upon the notion
of a Turing machine, the collection of uncomputable functions for a quantum
computer is the same as the collection of uncomputable functions for a Tur-
ing machine. Like existing computers, quantum computers will possess a finite
memory. And like existing digital computers, a quantum computer will only be
able to represent discrete things.
Not only should a metaphysical hypothesis or theory have physical implica-
tions, but it should be formulated with the precise concepts provided by mathe-
matics, just like a physical hypothesis or theory. There is no reason why natural
language should be adequate in metaphysics when it is inadequate in physics.
The meanings of the terms in mathematics are precisely established with stip-
ulative definitions. In contrast, the meanings of the terms in natural language
are often determined by use, and the use is inconsistent amongst the community
of language users. If use determines meaning, and use is inconsistent, then it
follows that meaning is ambiguous. Use varies from one member of the commu-
nity to another, and use changes over time, hence if use determines meaning,
then meanings vary from one member of the community to another, and mean-
ings change over time.2 This makes natural language inadequate if precision is
sought.
If one defines metaphysics as the study of that which possibly exists beyond
the empirically detectable world, there is nothing in that definition which entails
that physics cannot have any metaphysical implications, or vice versa, and there
is nothing in that definition which entails that mathematics cannot be used to
formulate metaphysical theories. It would be strange indeed if a discipline were
defined not by its subject matter, but by the methodological tools contingently
used at one time to study that subject matter. If metaphysics were defined to
be the natural language study of that which possibly exists beyond the empir-
ically detectable world, it would be rather like an architect who refuses to use
2The meaning of a term in natural language should be given by a statistical distribution
which specifies the relative frequency of the different uses of the term. The ambiguity of a
term could be quantified with the variance of the statistical distribution. A highly peaked
distribution, with a small variance, would indicate a term with low ambiguity. A flattened
distribution, with a large variance, would indicate a term with high ambiguity.
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Computer Aided Design tools because he has defined architectural design to
be a matter of pen and paper alone. If the pursuit of knowledge is one’s main
objective, then one uses every conceptual resource at one’s disposal.
Kant’s metaphysics provides a good example of what is wrong with tra-
ditional metaphysics. His principal metaphysical assertion is that there are
things-in-themselves, so-called ‘noumena’, which exist beyond the empirically
accessible world. Although Kant seems to resist claiming that noumena cause
phenomena, he does believe that phenomena are dependent in some way upon
noumena. However, he also claims that the noumena are unknowable. If there
are things-in-themselves, the noumena, and if they do have some relationship
to phenomena, then any well-developed, detailed speculation about the nature
of the noumena must have testable predictions about phenomena. Only if the
noumena have no relationship to phenomena could they be unknowable. Kant,
and his advocates in subsequent centuries, should have made some attempt to
define noumena, using mathematical concepts, and should have derived testable
predictions from their theoretical models. The only logical reason not to would
be the dogmatic assertion that the noumena are beyond cognition; not just
unknowable, but inconceivable as well.
Because Kant believed that a noumenal world beyond the empirical world
must be unknowable, he attempted to re-define metaphysics. He believed that
the faculties of cognition, the forms of experience, and the ‘categories’ of under-
standing exist independently of the content of our experience. Kant advocated
the study of these things as metaphysics in the sense that they are independent
of the content of experience. He urged that metaphysics should move away
from speculation about the unknowable to study of the knowable. The false
assumption in this reasoning is that a world beyond the empirical world must
be unknowable.
Let us illustrate the claim that a metaphysical hypothesis should be formu-
lated with the precise concepts of mathematics. One could hypothesize that
both the transcendent, metaphysical world and the physical world are repre-
sented by mathematical structures, and they are related by a mathematical
mapping. LetM denote the mathematical structure which represents the meta-
physical world, and let N denote the mathematical structure which represents
the physical world. One can postulate that both M and N must have
1. A cardinality
2. A topology
3. A dimension
4. A geometry
and one can postulate that they are related by a projection mapping M→ N
which is
1. Non-injective, and therefore, non-invertible
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2. Continuous
3. Either dimension-lowering or dimension-preserving
4. Non-isometric
Note that condition 2 relates to the topological notion of continuity, and
should not be confused with the cardinal notion of the continuum. A cardinality
is not specified for either M or N . Even if both were discrete mathematical
structures, they could each possess a topology, and the projection mapping
could be continuous with respect to these topologies. Condition 3 means that
the physical world, N , is either of lower dimension than the metaphysical world,
M, or they are of equal dimension.
This particular metaphysical hypothesis is formally analogous to sugges-
tions in some branches of physics that the universe has many more dimensions
than we currently detect. For example, the original Kaluza-Klein theory pre-
dicted that the universe actually has 5 dimensions, and more recent versions
predict many more dimensions. These theories have the empirically detectable
4-dimensional space-time diffeomorphically embedded in an n-dimensional man-
ifold. The fields and geometry on the 4-dimensional submanifold are obtained
from the n-dimensional manifold by what is either called a parallel or orthog-
onal projection. It must be conceded that these theories do not consider the
n-dimensional reality to be metaphysical. In some cases, at least, this is be-
cause the n-dimensional reality is merely inaccessible at low-energies. Being
detectable at higher energies, it is not a metaphysical reality. The fact that
we cannot directly perceive the higher dimensions simply places them in the
same category as the electron: they are empirically detectable, in principle, but
not directly perceivable. The proposed relationship between the metaphysical
world and the physical world is merely analogous to the relationship between
the n-dimensional physical world and the perceptible world in Kaluza-Klein
theories.
The relationship between the 3-dimensional physical world and phenome-
nal experience is also given by a projective transformation. The 3-dimensional
physical world is projected onto the human retina, a 2-dimensional surface, by
means of a perspective projection transformation. A perspective projection is
simply a special case of the more general type of projective transformation which
I defined above. The relationships between the 4-dimensional objects of gen-
eral relativity and the measurements of an observer are also given by projection
mappings.
To reiterate, the postulated projection mapping from the metaphysical world
to the physical world is given to illustrate how a metaphysical hypothesis can
be formulated with the precise concepts of mathematics. It is not intended to
be a serious proposal. One can imagine other metaphysical hypotheses which
do not satisfy this projective relationship. In fact, the computer program hy-
pothesis might not satisfy this relationship. Notably, in the case of Platonic
metaphysics, there appears to be a projective mapping in the opposite direc-
tion. If many objects in the physical world are instances of one Platonic form
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in the metaphysical ‘Platonic realm’, then there appears to be a projection
mapping from the physical world to the Platonic realm.
Mathematics provides a vast resource of precise concepts which are just as
applicable to metaphysics as they are to physics.3 Resistance to the application
of mathematics in metaphysics could be founded on two possible objections:
• Mathematics is a non-foundational construction; the fundamental con-
cepts one is trying to elucidate in metaphysics are taken for granted in
mathematics; the fundamental concepts of mathematics are expressed in
natural language. Hence, it might be argued, natural language is the
appropriate medium for analysing foundational concepts.
• Mathematics is merely formal and abstract.
The first objection underestimates the capacity of mathematics to engage in
foundational work. Mathematics is able to take the foundational concepts found
in natural langauge, and generalise. For example, the Boolean logic expressed
in natural language corresponds to the special case of a distributive lattice in
a more general range of mathematical structures. The second objection fails to
appreciate that the models of mathematical structures, i.e. the things which
instantiate them, need not be constructed from numbers. Hence, the models of
mathematical structures need not be abstract themselves. Physical objects can
be the instances of mathematical structures, and so can metaphysical objects.
3 Deriving empirical predictions from the meta-
physical hypothesis
J.D.Barrow has claimed that if our universe is a computer program, then all
the laws of physics must involve computable functions, (Barrow 1991, p205).
A computable function is defined to be a function whose value can always be
calculated by performing a finite sequence of well-defined steps, often called an
‘effective procedure’. Certainly, if a universe unfolds in time on a computer,
evolution equations must be used to calculate each time-step from the preced-
ing time-step, and a solution of those evolution equations implemented on a
3This paper urges the use of mathematics in metaphysics, defined as the study of that
which possibly exists beyond the physical world. However, mathematics can also be applied to
metaphysics, defined as the general, foundational study of the nature of things. For example,
one could propose that to understand the mind-brain relationship, it will be necessary to
represent the brain as a mathematical category and the mind as a different mathematical
category. One could propose that the relationship between the mind and the brain will be
given by a functor between these two distinct categories. One could propose that every brain
state corresponds to an object in the brain-category, every brain process corresponds to a
one-parameter family of morphisms in the brain-category, every mental state corresponds to
an object in the mind-category, and every mental process corresponds to a one-parameter
family of morphisms in the mind-category. A mental state is not isomorphic to a brain state,
but instead there is a functor which maps each mental state to a brain state, and which maps
each mental process to a brain process. The functorial relationship expresses precisely the
sense in which the mind is ‘reducible’ to the brain.
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computer must be a computable function. If the solutions of the fundamen-
tal evolution equations of physics were found to be non-computable functions,
then the computer program hypothesis would be falsified. Whilst the computer
program hypothesis therefore predicts that the solutions to the fundamental evo-
lution equations of physics must be computable functions, computability would
not be necessary to represent, at once, an entire space-time on a computer.
Computability is only a requirement if the representation attempts to calculate
one aspect of the universe from another aspect. As Tegmark remarks, “since
we can choose to picture our Universe not as a 3D world where things happen,
but as a 4D world that merely is, there is no need for the computer to compute
anything at all - it could simply store all the 4D data,” (Tegmark 1998, p26).
Note also that algorithmic compressibility is not a necessary condition to
represent a universe on a computer. A digital representation of something is
defined to be algorithmically compressible if the length, in bits, of the shortest
program capable of generating that digital representation, is shorter than the
length, in bits, of the digital representation itself. Our universe might not be
algorithmically compressible, but might still be digitally representable on a com-
puter. What follows is an attempt to derive more specific empirical predictions
from the computer program hypothesis.
To represent the entire universe on a computer one must use either:
• A unified theory of everything.
or
• A set of different theories, each with its own limited domain of applicabil-
ity, such that the set of domains covers the entire universe.
We do not, at present, have a unified theory of everything, but we do have
a set of different theories, which grow progressively closer to covering the entire
universe, in all its detail. Of these, the only empirically verified theory which
is capable of describing the universe as a whole is general relativity. However,
although general relativity can represent the universe as a whole, when it does
so, it is only concerned with the large scale structure of the universe. It cannot
represent detail on all length scales, as a unified theory of everything could be
expected to do. Nevertheless, because general relativity has been empirically
verified, the predictions of a unified theory of everything would have to converge
to the predictions of general relativity within general relativity’s domain of
applicability.
The physical predictions derived from the metaphysical computer program
hypothesis will be derived from an examination of how to represent a general
relativistic universe on a computer. This is perhaps a weak point of the strat-
egy. The universe may not be a 4-dimensional Lorentzian manifold, as it is
represented to be in general relativity. We do not know what type of thing a
unified theory of everything, incorporating a theory of quantum gravity, would
represent the universe to be. It is, therefore, a provisional decision to consider
a universe created on a computer to be a general relativistic universe.
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In addition, the predictions derived assume that a digital computer is the
only type of computer which has the potential to simulate an entire universe.
Although it isn’t proven to be impossible for an analog computer to simulate an
entire universe, the current evidence suggests that an analog computer cannot
have the representational capacity to do so. An analog computer uses concrete
(and continuous) physical quantities of one sort, (e.g. electrical quantities or
hydraulic quantities), to represent concrete (and continuous) physical quantities
of another sort, (e.g. the varying height of tides). In other words, an analog
computer uses the concrete physical quantities of its physical components to
represent the physical quantities of the system to be simulated. Early analog
computers were constructed from levers, cogs, cams, discs and gears, and used
mechanical motions to perform calculations. Modern analog computers tend to
use electrical quantities, such as voltage levels, to represent the quantities of a
simulated system, and specially designed circuits are used to perform arithmetic
upon these voltage levels. Whilst an analog computer might use voltage levels
to represent the values of quantities on a simulated system, a digital computer
uses voltage levels to represent bits, and then sequences of bits encode the val-
ues of quantities on a simulated system. Analog computers tend to rely upon
a mathematical resemblance between the pattern of quantity-values possessed
by the machine and the pattern of quantity-values possessed by the simulated
system.4 Analog computers do not use the versatile, encoded, abstract repre-
sentation of physical quantities that a digital computer uses, and this limits
their representational capacity.5
It is often claimed that the variables of an analog computer are, in fact,
continuously variable, but this claim can be disputed. Variables such as electri-
cal voltage or fluid pressure are probably discrete when they are reduced to the
quantum level. Even if there are other variables which are genuinely continuous,
it would still not be possible to precisely control their value. Suppose for the
sake of argument that voltage is continuously variable. It would be impossible
to set a precise input voltage of, say, 5.34V. The best one could ever do is to
set an input voltage within some interval, say 5.34V±0.01. This point is better
illustrated for the case of irrational numbers. It is impossible to set an input
voltage of pi, and this is not because of the limitations of current technology,
but because infinite precision is not attainable.
In general relativity, space is represented as a 3-dimensional differential man-
ifold, and space-time is represented as a 4-dimensional differential manifold. A
digital computer, as it is currently understood, can only deal with discrete items
of data. The most crucial fact to recognize about a computer program is that
the data objects defined in it are built from Z, the set of integers. In contrast,
the objects of analytic mathematics are built from R, the set of real numbers.
The memory of a classical, (i.e. non-quantum), digital computer consists of elec-
4A good example of a mechanical analog computer is an orrery, a clockwork device for
simulating the solar system. The actual position and motion of the balls representing the
planets, represents the actual position and motion of the planets.
5As an exception, Hava Siegelmann (1999) has proposed neural net analog computers which
are abstract encoders, like a digital computer.
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tronic circuits which have two possible voltage states. These voltage states are
represented by binary digits, otherwise known as ‘bits’. An element of memory
is therefore called a ‘bit’. Each bit of memory has two possible states, repre-
sented as 0 and 1. The set of possible states of a bit can be represented as
Z2 = Z/2Z = {0, 1}, the additive group of integers, modulo 2. Z2 is a reali-
sation of the cyclic group of two elements. Each byte of memory, a string of 8
bits, and the smallest addressable unit of memory, can be represented by
(Z2)8 = Z2 × Z2 × Z2 × Z2 × Z2 × Z2 × Z2 × Z2,
the 8-fold Cartesian product of Z2. Thus, for a classical computer with n bytes
of memory, the entire memory can be represented by (Z2)8n, a discrete mathe-
matical structure of 8n dimensions. All the data objects defined in a program
correspond to regions of memory, hence the data objects defined in a program
are built from subsets of the discrete mathematical structure (Z2)8n.
The memory of a quantum computer consists of physical systems which
possess a quantum state space isomorphic to the 2-dimensional complex Hilbert
space C2. Each such memory element is referred to as a ‘qubit’, or ‘Qbit’. A
string of n qubits is represented by the n-fold tensor product of C2. Hence, the
state of 8 qubits is represented by a vector in
(C2)8 = C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2
As a consequence, the state of the n qubits can be quantum mechanically en-
tangled.
Each qubit is considered to have a fixed basis, {v0, v1}. Each vector in the
n-fold tensor product consists of a complex linear combination of the 2n basis
vectors {vi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vin : i1 = 0, 1, ..., in = 0, 1}. The algorithms of a quantum
computer correspond to unitary operators upon these complex Hilbert spaces.
Because C2 is built from the set of real numbers, and because each qubit C2
possesses a continuum of quantum states, it might appear that a quantum com-
puter can store an infinite amount of information. This appearance, however,
is deceptive. Whilst there are a continuum of possible unitary operators on
a qubit Hilbert space, each quantum computer will only be engineered to im-
plement a finite collection. Moreover, each quantum computation must cease
with a measurement of the state of the n qubits, and this collapses the state
from a linear combination of the basis vectors into one of the fixed basis vec-
tors, vi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vin . The initial state on which the unitary transformations can
operate is also such a state, and as Mermin comments, “the entire role of the
state of the Qbits at any stage of a succession of unitary transformations is to
encapsulate the probability of the outcomes, should the final measurement be
made at that stage of the process,” (2002, p16). Thus, a quantum computer,
like a classical computer, possesses a finite number of accessible states. In fact,
n qubits of memory possess exactly the same number of accessible states as n
bits of memory, namely 2n. The data objects defined in a program running on
a quantum computer are discrete objects.
16
Because every manifold has the cardinality of the continuum, and because
digital computers can only represent discrete objects, it is impossible to exactly
represent a manifold on a digital computer. It is, therefore, impossible on a dig-
ital computer to exactly represent space and space-time as they are represented
in general relativity.
If space and space-time actually are manifolds, and if a manifold cannot be
exactly represented on a digital computer, then space and space-time cannot
be exactly represented on a digital computer. If the space and space-time of
our universe cannot be exactly represented on a digital computer, then our
universe cannot be a computer program running on a digital computer in another
universe.
However, as already mentioned, the space and space-time of our universe
may not actually be manifolds. Space and space-time may not exactly be as
they are represented to be in general relativity. Perhaps space and space-time
are discrete, and perhaps the manifolds of general relativity only provide an
idealisation of a discrete reality. The space and space-time of our universe can
only be exactly represented on a computer if space and space-time are discrete.
Loop quantum gravity offers, perhaps, a mathematically rigorous means to
quantize general relativity, and loop quantum gravity suggests that space is
discrete in some sense. Using Ashtekar’s ‘new variables’ approach, canonical
general relativity can be cast in the form of a canonical gauge theory, albeit
a gauge theory with additional constraints to the Gauss constraint. The con-
figuration space is a space of SU(2)-connections on a principal fibre bundle
over a 3-manifold Σ. In loop quantum gravity, each closed curve (‘loop’) in the
3-manifold defines a functional on the space of SU(2)-connections. This func-
tional is obtained by taking the holonomy of each connection around the loop,
representing that group element as an operator on a vector space, and then
taking the trace of that operator. Furthermore, each ‘spin network’ embedded
in the 3-manifold defines a functional on the space of SU(2)-connections. A
spin network, treated in isolation, is a discrete mathematical object consisting
of a graph, (a collection of vertices and edges), an irreducible representation of
SU(2) assigned to each edge, and an ‘intertwining’ operator between such repre-
sentations assigned to each vertex. Such a graph embedded in the 3-manifold Σ
defines a functional on the space of SU(2)-connections by taking the holonomy
of a connection along each edge, using the representations to obtain operators
along each edge, forming the tensor product of all those operators, tensoring
that with all the intertwining operators, and then contracting to obtain a num-
ber, the number assigned to the connection, (Baez 1995, p19). Such functionals
turn out to be eigenvectors of operators which purportedly represent the area
of surfaces in the 3-manifold and the volume of regions in the 3-manifold. Fur-
thermore, these operators have discrete spectra.
If one accepts that quantum theory provides a complete description of a
physical system, then, arguably, it is not the configurations of the classical
system which exist, but the quantum state function(al). Hence, in the case of
loop quantum gravity, the 3-manifold used to define the classical configuration
space does not exist. Rather, it is the state functional defined by the spin
17
network which exists.
Many important questions remain. For example, the dynamics of loop quan-
tum gravity remain intransigent, and there is no obvious classical limit to the
theory. Whilst it is claimed that area and volume are discrete, what are they
the area and volume of, if a 3-manifold does not exist? Are area and volume
re-interpreted as properties of spin networks?
The established means of finding a discrete approximation to a manifold, is
to find a cell complex which is homeomorphic to the manifold. In particular,
one tries to find a simplicial complex which is homeomorphic to the manifold.
The schema of the simplicial complex is a discrete mathematical object, which
can be exactly represented on a computer. By representing the schema on a
computer, one approximately represents the manifold.
If the schema of a simplicial complex is the natural discrete approximation
to a manifold, then, conversely, the manifold can be said to be the natural
continuum idealisation of the schema. If space and space-time are actually
discrete, but if they can also be represented in a continuum idealisation as a
3-manifold and 4-manifold, respectively, then it is natural to suggest that space
is actually a 3-dimensional schema, and space-time is actually a 4-dimensional
schema. Regge calculus is generally considered to be the ‘discretized’ version of
general relativity, and Regge calculus duly represents space and space-time as
a simplicial complex.
Loop quantum gravity demonstrates that, although space and space-time
might not be manifolds, they might not be the schema of simplicial complexes
either. However, if space and space-time actually are discrete, it may be that
they are best represented by loop quantum gravity on small scales, and best
represented by the schema of simplicial complexes on large scales.
Some explanation of the mathematics is in order here. An n-cell is an object
which is homeomorphic with the n-ball in n-dimensional Euclidean space, Dn =
{x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖ = 1}. For example, a 2-ball is a disc, bounded by a circle, while
a 3-ball is a solid ball bounded by a 2-sphere. Any polygon is homeomorphic
with a 2-ball, and is therefore a 2-cell. Any solid polyhedron is homeomorphic
with a 3-ball, and is therefore a 3-cell.
A cell-complex is obtained by pasting together any number of cells, so that
the faces of the cells are either disjoint, or so that they coincide completely. A
3-dimensional cell-complex is obtained by pasting together 3-cells in such a way
that the faces, edges and vertices of the cells are either disjoint, or they coincide
completely.
The most interesting type of cell is a simplex. A 0-simplex is a point, or
‘vertex’, a 1-simplex is a line segment, or ‘edge’, a 2-simplex is a triangle, and
a 3-simplex is a solid tetrahedron. By pasting together simplices, one obtains
a simplicial complex, (see Stillwell 1992, p23-24). A 3-dimensional simplicial
complex is obtained by pasting together solid tetrahedra. The schema of a 3-
dimensional simplicial complex can be specified as follows. First, one declares
all the vertices in the complex. Next, one can specify which subsets of the set of
vertices correspond to simplexes. By specifying a pair of vertices, {Pi, Pj}, one
indicates that those vertices are connected by an edge. One can then specify
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which triples {Pi, Pj , Pk} of vertices correspond to the faces, and finally one can
list which quadruples {Pi, Pj , Pk, Pl} of vertices correspond to the tetrahedra.
One could alternatively give each edge a name, and then specify which triples
of adjoining edges are connected by a face. One would then name each face,
and specify which quadruples of adjoining faces are connected by a tetrahedron,
(see Geroch and Hartle 1986, p546).
Although the manifold models of general relativity may be idealisations, one
particular manifold model may eventually be verified by observation, to the
exclusion of all others. To be specific, either a Friedmann-Roberston-Walker
(FRW) model, a small perturbation of a FRW model, or an exact solution close
to a FRW model, may be verified by astronomical observation. If the computer
program hypothesis predicts that space or space-time is actually the schema of
a simplicial complex on large scales, then the manifold model of the large-scale
universe must be homeomorphic with a simplicial complex whose schema can
be represented on a computer. It is therefore important to determine which
manifold models of general relativity can be discretely represented on a digital
computer by the schema of a simplicial complex. If a particular manifold model
were to be verified by astronomical observation, but that model could not be
represented by a schema on a digital computer, then the hypothesis that our
universe is a computer program running on a digital computer would be falsified.
Suppose, then, that one tries to represent space-time on a computer with the
schema of a 4-dimensional simplicial complex. Unfortunately, it is not known
if every 4-manifold is homeomorphic to a simplicial complex. Hence, there
may be 4-manifolds which cannot be discretely represented by the schema of a
simplicial complex. If the space-time of the universe has a manifold idealisation
which does not have a homeomorphic simplicial complex, then the space-time
of the universe would not be representable on a computer by the schema of a
simplicial complex. If there were no other means of discretely representing such
a 4-manifold on a computer, then the space-time of the universe would not be
representable on a digital computer.
More seriously, because a computer can only store a finite amount of data,
it can only represent the schema of a finite simplicial complex, a simplicial
complex which contains a finite number of simplexes. A finite simplicial complex
can only be homeomorphic to a compact manifold, hence only a compact 4-
manifold is discretely representable by a schema on a computer. Unfortunately,
a compact 4-manifold cannot accept a Lorentzian metric. If the space-time
of our universe is Lorentzian, then our universe can only be a non-compact
Lorentzian 4-manifold. One possible conclusion to draw is that one cannot
represent a universe like our own on a computer if one tries to represent the
entire 4-dimensional history of the universe.
As an alternative, the geometrodynamical formulation of general relativ-
ity employs a so-called ‘3+1’ decomposition of space-time. One chooses a 3-
manifold Σ, and one studies the time-evolution of the geometry and matter
fields on Σ. As the geometry and matter fields evolve, a 4-dimensional space-
time unfolds. Such a space-time will, of necessity, have the topology of R1 ×Σ.
The geometrodynamical formulation is advantageous because of Moise’s tri-
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angulation theorem for 3-manifolds, (Stillwell 1992, p25 and p242). Moise
demonstrated that every 3-manifold is homeomorphic with a simplicial com-
plex; one says that every 3-manifold can be ‘triangulated’. Although it is true
that every n-manifold can be triangulated for n ≤ 3, it is, to reiterate, unknown
whether all 4-manifolds can be triangulated.
Moise’s theorem means that any possible topology of the spatial universe can
be discretely represented with the schema of a 3-dimensional simplicial complex.
Once again, however, a digital computer can only represent the schema of a finite
simplicial complex. Whilst a compact 3-manifold is homeomorphic with a finite
simplicial complex, a non-compact 3-manifold can only be homeomorphic with
an infinite simplicial complex, a complex which contains an infinite number of
simplexes.
Only a compact 3-manifold can be homeomorphic with a 3-dimensional sim-
plicial complex whose schema is representable on a digital computer. Hence, if
our universe is a program running on a digital computer, then our spatial uni-
verse must have a compact spatial topology in a continuum idealisation. The
hypothesis that our universe is a program on a digital computer, predicts that
the spatial universe is discrete, and yields the potentially testable prediction
that our universe has compact spatial topology in a continuum idealisation.
The prediction of compact spatial topology means that the Euclidean R3
and hyperbolic H3 FRW universes are both inconsistent with the computer
program hypothesis. The only FRW universe which has both simply connected
and compact spatial topology, is the S3-universe. Hence, the only simply con-
nected FRW universe which could be discretely represented on a computer, is
the S3-universe. There are, however, a host of multiply connected compact
FRW universes. The spatial geometry of each such universe is obtained as a
quotient Σ/Γ of a simply connected Riemannian space form6 Σ, where Γ is a
discrete, properly discontinuous, fixed-point free subgroup of the isometry group
I(Σ), (O’Neill 1983, p243 and Boothby 1986, p406, Theorem 6.5).
Compact FRW models exist for any value of sectional curvature k. Of the 18
flat, k = 0, 3-dimensional Riemannian space forms, 10 are compact. Given that
one can only create compact FRW universes on a computer, it follows that one
can only create 10 topologically different k = 0 FRW universes on a computer.
All of the 3-dimensional Riemannian space forms of constant positive cur-
vature are compact, hence they could all be created on a computer.
Whilst there are compact and non-compact quotients H3/Γ, there are an
infinite number of such compact quotients. The work of Thurston demonstrates
that ‘most’ compact and orientable 3-manifolds can be equipped with a com-
plete Riemannian metric tensor of constant negative sectional curvature. This
means that ‘most’ compact, orientable 3-manifolds can be obtained as a quo-
tient H3/Γ of hyperbolic 3-space.7 One can therefore create an infinite number
of possible negative curvature FRW universes on a computer. However, there is
no compact k = −1 space form which is globally homogeneous. H3 itself is the
6A complete and connected Riemannian manifold of constant sectional curvature is called
a Riemannian space form.
7The meaning of ‘most’ in this context involves Dehn surgery, (Besse 1987, p159-160).
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only globally homogeneous 3-dimensional Riemannian space form of constant
negative curvature, and H3 is, of course, non-compact. Given that one can only
create a compact universe on a computer, one cannot create a k = −1 FRW uni-
verse on a computer which is globally homogeneous. Thus, if our own universe
is a globally homogeneous k = −1 FRW universe, it cannot exist on a computer.
However, a locally homogeneous k = −1 FRW universe, with compact, multiply
connected topology, could exist on a computer, and it is only local homogeneity
which our astronomical observations are capable of detecting.
In practice it is difficult to test the prediction of compact spatial topology.
Observational evidence currently indicates that our universe is a FRW universe,
but there is no observable parameter in a FRW model which determines the
spatial topology. Thus, there is no necessary link between the spatial topology
of a FRW universe and the value of the density parameter Ω0; one cannot infer
the spatial topology of our universe from Ω0.
However, in a ‘small’, compact, multiply connected universe, it is possible
to see around the entire universe. To understand this, begin by recalling that a
Riemannian manifold (Σ, γ) has a natural metric space structure. The metric
tensor γ determines a Riemannian distance d(p, q) between any pair of points
p, q ∈ Σ. The Riemannian distance d(p, q) is dimensionless, in the sense that
it lacks any physical units. In a FRW model, it is the scale factor R(t) which
introduces physical units of distance. The physical distance between p and q at
time t is R(t)d(p, q). Because R(t) has physical units, so does R(t)d(p, q).
For any FRW universe, one can calculate the maximum Riemannian dis-
tance, dmax, that light has travelled by a time t0, which is considered to be the
present time. The relevant equation is
dmax(t0) =
∫ t0
0
c
R(t)
dt
A civilization located at some point p in space, will, at time t0, be able to
see no further, in any direction, than a Riemannian distance of dmax(t0). This
distance can therefore be referred to as the Riemannian horizon distance. It is,
of course, a dimensionless quantity.
Now, recalling that the diameter of a metric space is the supremum of the
distances which can separate pairs of points, it is a fact that any compact Rie-
mannian manifold is a metric space of finite diameter. If one created, on a
computer, a FRW universe in which (Σ, γ) were a compact Riemannian man-
ifold of sufficiently small diameter, diam (Σ, γ), then the Riemannian horizon
distance dmax(t0) could exceed diam (Σ, γ) by the time t0 ∼ 1010. If so, the
horizon would have disappeared for the observers in that universe. They would
be able to see their entire spatial universe. No point of their universe could be
separated from them by a Riemannian distance greater than diam (Σ, γ), so if
dmax(t0) ≥ diam (Σ, γ), then they would be able to receive light from all regions
of their spatial universe.
In such universes, individual galaxies and clusters of galaxies would produce
multiple images upon the celestial sphere of planet-bound observers, (see El-
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lis 1971). Different compact spatial topologies and geometries would produce
different patterns of ghost images and multiple images upon the celestial sphere.
However, although compact spatial topology is a necessary condition for
the entire spatial universe to be visible, it is not a sufficient condition. Our
universe might have compact spatial topology, but if it is a ‘large’ compact
universe, then all of space will not be visible. For all of space to be visible
when the universe is only ∼ 1010 yrs old, the Riemannian manifold (Σ, γ) which
represents the spatial universe must be sufficiently small, as well as compact,
Even if our spatial universe is small and compact, it would be extremely difficult
to identify multiple images of galaxy clusters. Hence, although the presence of
multiple images would verify the hypothesis of a small, compact universe, the
fact that they have not been identified at the current time does not falsify the
hypothesis. A better means of testing the hypothesis is to search for paired
circles in the microwave background radiation. Recent research indicates that
if such paired circles exist, then one could derive the spatial topology from
the specific pattern of paired circles, (see Cornish, Spergel, Starkman 1998).
The CMBR power spectrum can also be used to determine whether our spatial
universe is a small compact universe. A small compact universe would affect
the CMBR power spectrum on large angular scales. The WMAP satellite has
revealed anomalies in the CMBR power spectrum on large angular scales. The
quadrupole l = 2 mode was found to be about 1/7 the strength predicted for
an infinite flat universe, while the octopole l = 3 mode was 72% of the strength
predicted for such a non-compact k = 0 universe, (Luminet et al 2003, p3).
The presence of paired circles or specific anomalies in the CMBR power
spectrum would verify that the universe is spatially compact, and would thereby
verify the computer program hypothesis. Unfortunately, the absence of paired
circles or anomalies in the power spectrum would not entail that the spatial
universe is non-compact. Our universe could simply be a large compact universe.
Hence, the absence of paired circles or anomalies in the power spectrum would
not falsify the computer program hypothesis.
Predictions about the lifetime of our universe are easier to test than predic-
tions about the spatial topology. The lifetime of our universe is determined by
parameters such as the Hubble parameter H0 and the density parameter Ω0,
which can be inferred from observation. Hence, if the computer program hy-
pothesis made predictions about the lifetime of our universe, it would be easier
to test it. If a universe is represented by a Lorentzian manifold (M, g), then the
lifetime of the universe corresponds to the ‘timelike diameter’ of (M, g). The
timelike diameter of (M, g) is the supremum of the length of all past-directed
timelike curves in (M, g). As Beem and Ehrlich comment, “the timelike diame-
ter represents the supremum of possible proper times any particle could possibly
experience in the given space-time,” (Beem and Ehrlich 1980, p329).
If a Lorentzian manifold with an infinite timelike diameter were represented
by a numerical solution of the Einstein geometrodynamical equations, and if the
size of the time steps in the numerical solution were constant, then an infinite
number of time steps would be necessary. An infinite amount of information
would have to be processed. Alternatively, if the size of the time steps diverge
22
exponentially as t → ∞, a numerical solution would only require a finite num-
ber of time steps. The ever-expanding k ≤ 0 FRW universes are examples of
universes with an infinite lifetime. If a computer in a universe with an infinite
lifetime could process information at a constant rate, then it could process an
infinite amount of information. However, an ever-expanding universe will suf-
fer an entropy ‘heat death’, the amount of free energy available converging to
zero as t → ∞. Brillouin’s inequality entails that there is a minimum, positive
amount of free energy which must be expended to process a bit of information.
Where ∆I is the amount of information processed in bits,
∆I ≤ ∆E/kBT ln 2 .
∆E is the free energy expended, T is the absolute temperature in degrees K,
and kB is Boltzmann’s constant, (Barrow and Tipler 1986, p661). At first sight,
this suggests that it is impossible to process an infinite amount of information in
an ever-expanding universe because the amount of free energy converges to zero.
However, the amount of energy which must be expended per bit of information
processed is temperature dependent. From the inequality above, one can derive
the following constraint on the rate at which information can be processed:
dI/dt ≤ dE/dt
kBT ln 2
.
In turn, this entails the following constraint on the total amount of information
I which can be processed between the current time t0 and some future time tf ,
which might be ∞:
I =
∫ tf
t0
dI
dt
dt ≤ (kB ln 2)−1
∫ tf
t0
T−1
dE
dt
dt .
If the temperature converges to zero, T → 0, as it does in an ever-expanding
Ω0 ≤ 1 universe, then the amount of free energy which needs to be expended
per bit converges to zero. Hence, although the amount of free energy converges
to zero, so also does the amount of free energy which needs to be expended
per bit. Thus, because the integral
∫∞
t0
T−1(dE/dt) dt can diverge, it may still
be possible to process an infinite amount of information in an ever-expanding
universe, even if the total free energy expended
∫∞
t0
(dE/dt) dt is finite, (Barrow
and Tipler 1986, p663).
In Ω0 > 1 universes, because the temperature diverges near the final singu-
larity, the rate at which free energy is expended dE/dt, and therefore the total
energy expended
∫ tf
t0
(dE/dt) dt, must diverge if the total information processed
is to diverge.
If Ω0 ≤ 1 in our universe, as current astronomical evidence indicates, then
our universe has an infinite timelike diameter. Assuming that the simulation of
such a universe would require an infinite amount of information to be processed,
the possibility of the computer program hypothesis then rests upon whether it
is physically possible for the integral
∫ tf
t0
T−1(dE/dt) dt to diverge in either a
Ω0 ≤ 1 universe or a Ω0 > 1 universe. In both cases this remains a matter of
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debate. If it is not physically possible for the integral to diverge in either case,
and if the observation that Ω0 ≤ 1 in our universe is reliable, then could one
conclude that our universe is not a program running on a computer in another
universe? If it is impossible to process an infinite amount of information, then
the only type of universe which could be entirely simulated on a computer
would be a finite lifetime universe. However, it remains possible that a partial
simulation of a Ω0 ≤ 1 universe could be created on a computer in another
universe, a finite lifetime subset of the entire Ω0 ≤ 1 universe. Hence, even if
our universe is a Ω0 ≤ 1 universe, and even if it is impossible to process an
infinite amount of information, our universe could be a finite lifetime simulation
running on a computer in another universe.
Not only could the computer program hypothesis be falsified by empirical in-
vestigation, but there are logical constraints upon what it is possible to simulate
on a computer.
A computer is a finite volume subsystem of a universe which is capable of
representing the state of other systems. A system can represent, exactly and
completely, the state of another system, if and only if the amount of information
which can be coded in the first system is greater than or equal to the amount
of information which can be coded in the other system. An entire universe is
a special type of system. Hence, a subsystem of a universe A can represent,
exactly and completely, the state of a universe B, if and only if the amount of
information which can be coded in the subsystem of A is greater than or equal
to the amount of information which can be coded in universe B.
As a special case, if the amount of information which can be coded in a
subsystem of a universe A is less than the amount of information which can
be coded in the entire universe A , then it is impossible for the subsystem of
universe A to represent, exactly and completely, the entire universe A .
The amount of information which can be coded in a system is determined by
the number of possible different states of the system. If N denotes the number
of possible states, then the amount of information I which can be coded, in bits,
is simply I = log2N . Hence, if the number of possible states of a subsystem
of a universe is less than the number of possible states of the entire universe,
then it is impossible for that subsystem to represent, exactly and completely,
the entire universe.
However, just because a system is a subsystem of a universe, it does not
follow that the number of possible states of the system is less than the number
of possible states of the universe. True, if the number of possible states of a
subsystem is finite, then by virtue of being a subsystem, that finite number must
be smaller than the number of possible states of the entire universe. For every
state of a subsystem, there must be multiple states of the entire universe which
induce the same state upon that subsystem, hence the number of possible states
of the entire universe must be larger. However, if the number of possible states
of a subsystem is not finite, then it is possible that it has the same number
of possible states as the entire universe. A priori, it is quite possible that a
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subsystem of a universe A , and the entire universe A , both possess an infinite
number of states. If the state space of a subsystem has the same cardinality
as the state space of the entire universe, then, by definition, there exists at
least one bijective mapping between the two state spaces. Any such bijective
mapping would enable the states of the entire universe to be represented by the
states of the subsystem.
This argument can be presented in another way. If a subsystem S of our
universe represents the entire universe U , it must also represent S representing
U . If it does this, it must also represent S representing S representing U .
And so on, ad infinitum. This is possible only if the subsystem can store an
infinite amount of information.
If the entire universe only has a finite number of possible states, then a
subsystem will also have a finite number of states, and the number of subsystem
states will be smaller than the number of universe states. However, if the entire
universe has an infinite number of possible states, then a subsystem could have
either a finite number or an infinite number of possible states.
If the entire universe has an infinite number of possible states, then it could
conceivably possess either a continuous infinity of possible states, or a discrete
infinity. A digital computer could only represent the universe exactly if the
universe is discrete, hence the only case of interest is the case in which the
universe has a discrete infinity of possible states. A digital computer could only
represent the universe exactly and completely if the entire universe and the
computer subsystem of the universe both possess a discrete infinity of possible
states. In other words, a digital computer could only represent the universe
exactly and completely if both the computer and the universe can code a discrete
infinity of information.
A computer is a finite volume subsystem of the universe, hence to determine
if a computer could code the same amount of information as the entire universe,
it is necessary to determine if a finite volume subsystem can code a finite or
infinite amount of information. To answer this question, it is necessary to
determine what the physical structure of the universe is.
At present, it appears that there are discrete levels of physical structure in
the universe. All macroscopic material objects in our universe are composed of
chemical elements and chemical compounds. The latter are composed of atoms
in different combinations and organizations. Atoms are composed of electrons
and atomic nuclei. The nuclei of atoms are themselves composed of protons
and neutrons, which are themselves composed of quarks. The parts of material
objects do not appear to lie on a continuum.
Electrons and quarks are purported to be elementary particles, pieces of
matter which have no parts. If elementary particles do exist, then our universe
could be said to have a finite lower level of structure. There would be no levels
of structure below the level of elementary particles.
I propose that a finite volume subsystem is limited to coding a finite amount
of information if and only if the following three conditions are satisfied:
• The number of structure levels available in a finite volume of space is
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finite.
• On each structure level, there is a finite set of parts in a finite volume of
space.
• Each of the parts on each level of structure has a finite set of states.
A finite volume subsystem which satisfies these conditions has only a fi-
nite number of possible states, and therefore cannot code the same amount of
information which can be coded in the entire universe.
To reiterate, a computer could only represent the universe exactly and com-
pletely if a finite volume subsystem can code a discrete infinity of information.
It seems safe to assume that, on each level of structure, there is a finite set of
parts in any finite volume of space. The Bekenstein bound8 and the so-called
holographic bound of Susskind and ’t Hooft, purportedly entail that the parts
on each level of structure have a finite set of states, (Bekenstein 2003). More-
over, the existence of elementary particles would mean that there is a finite set
of structure levels in each finite volume of space. It would appear, therefore, at
first sight, that all three conditions are satisfied. It would appear that a finite
volume subsystem cannot code a discrete infinity of information, and it would
appear that a computer cannot represent the universe exactly and completely.
However, further thought raises some doubts. Both the Bekenstein bound
and the holographic bound place an upper limit on the entropy within a finite
volume of space. Given a finite quantity of weakly self-gravitating energy E in a
spherical volume of radius R, which is isolated from other systems, (Bekenstein
2004), the entropy S is subject to the following upper bound:
S ≤ 2piER/~c .
The holographic bound is independent of the quantity of energy, and places
the following limit on the entropy of a spherical volume of radius R, which is
isolated from other systems:
S ≤ pic3R2/~G .
In both cases, it is then assumed that a finite upper limit to the entropy of
a finite volume of space entails a finite upper limit to the information storage
capacity of that volume. This might be inferred from the following relationship:
Information = Maximum entropy− entropy .
By implication, it is the statistical states or macrostates of a system which
are the bearers of entropy and information here. The states which provide
a complete, detailed description of a system are referred to as ‘microstates’.
A statistical state expresses only partial knowledge of the state of a system,
and, in classical mechanics at least, corresponds to a probability distribution ρ
defined upon the space of microstates Γ. A macrostate is a set of macroscopically
8Otherwise known as the universal entropy bound.
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indistinguishable microstates ΓM , and corresponds to a special type of statistical
state in which the probability distribution is of a constant value |ΓM |−1 on ΓM ,
and zero elsewhere. |ΓM | denotes the volume of ΓM . The microstate of a system
inherits the entropy and information of the macrostate to which it belongs. The
entropy of an isolated system increases because the microstate of the system
moves into macrostates of ever greater entropy. The equation above means
that the information possessed by a system at a point in time is the difference
between the maximum entropy of the system, and the entropy possessed by
the system at that point in time. The maximum information which can be
possessed by a system is that which it possesses when the system’s entropy is
zero. Hence, according to the relationship above, the maximum information
equals the maximum entropy.
Whether this entails that a finite volume of space possesses a finite number
of states is a different question. In classical mechanics, a system consisting of n
particles has a 6n-dimensional continuum state space Γ, called the phase space.
The entropy S(ρ) of statistical state ρ in classical mechanics is defined to be
S(ρ) = −kB
∫
Γ
ρ log ρ dµ ,
where kB is Boltzmann’s constant. In the case of a macrostate ρM , this reduces
to
S(ρM ) = −kB
∫
ΓM
|ΓM |−1 log |ΓM |−1dµ
= −kB |ΓM |−1
∫
ΓM
log 1− log |ΓM |dµ
= kB |ΓM |−1
∫
ΓM
log |ΓM |dµ
= kB log |ΓM | .
Hence, although the entropy of a macrostate of such a system can be fi-
nite, it corresponds to a continuum of possible microstates. An upper limit to
entropy does not entail a finite number of possible states. I propose that the
link between entropy and information storage capacity is only valid for finite
state-space systems. When a system has an infinite number of states, but a
finite maximum entropy, I propose that it has an infinite information storage
capacity. Ultimately, each different state of a system can represent different
information, so a system with an infinite number of possible states, but a finite
volume state space, and therefore a finite maximum entropy, nevertheless has
an infinite information storage capacity.
To argue that a finite volume of space possesses a finite information storage
capacity, one might alternatively start from loop quantum gravity, and try to
argue that a finite volume of space only possesses a finite number of quantum
states. A finite volume of space corresponds to a finite number of spin network
nodes, and for a fixed finite number of nodes, there are a finite number of
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spin network states. For a system with a finite number of microstates, each
macrostate M corresponds to an equivalence class containing a finite number of
microstates, Num(M). The entropy of such a macrostate is simply
S = kB log Num(M) .
Hence, a system with a finite number of microstates possesses a finite maxi-
mum entropy, and therefore possesses an upper limit on its information storage
capacity.
However, quantum theory may not be the definitive theory of the physical
world. A quantum state may correspond to many, or an infinite number of actual
states. Even though there may be only a finite number of quantum states for a
finite volume of space, there may be an infinite number of actual states. It may
be that quantum theory is only valid for certain levels of structure, and it might
merely be that the amount of information which can be coded above a certain
length scale, or the amount of information which can be coded in a certain way,
is finite.
There is also no decisive evidence that elementary particles exist. If the
current candidates for elementary particles, such as quarks, do have parts, then
those parts might only be detectable at energies which are not currently available
in particle accelerators.
One could also dispute the assumption that, on each level of structure, there
is a finite set of parts in any finite volume of space. If each part has a non-zero
spatial extension with a well-defined boundary, and if the parts cannot inter-
penetrate, then it does indeed follow that there can only be a finite set of parts
packed into a finite volume of space. However, parts in quantum theory do seem
able to interpenetrate each other to some degree. If there are levels of structure
below the levels of the electron and quark, one might find very strange things,
beyond even quantum theory, like an infinite number of parts interpenetrating
each other in a finite volume of space.
Tipler claims that there could be a hierarchy of computer universes, just like
the hierarchy of so-called ‘virtual machines’ which can exist on a computer, and
he claims that we would not know which level of the hierarchy our own universe
exists at. Whilst I have argued that the Bekenstein bound does not entail that
a finite volume subsystem has only a finite number of possible states, Tipler
accepts this implication. This, I propose, is inconsistent with the claim that we
would not know which level of a universe hierarchy our own universe exists at.
When one computer is programmed so that it precisely mimics the input-
output behaviour of another computer, the latter is said to be emulated by
the former. The emulation program, running on the real computer, is said
to be a virtual machine. A real machine T1 can be programmed to emulate
another, producing a virtual machine T2. The virtual machine T2 can then
be programmed to emulate another computer, producing a higher level virtual
machine T3. These levels are referred to as levels of implementation.
28
A universe running on a computer could itself contain computers, upon
which other universes are running. The universes would be running at different
levels of implementation, and Tipler suggests, (1995, p208), that in this case,
the levels should be thought of as levels of reality. Tipler seems to assume that
there must be a lowest level of the hierarchy, and refers to this as ‘ultimate
reality’. Tipler claims that “we cannot know if the universe in which we find
ourselves is actually ultimate reality,” (ibid.).
However, whilst any one computer may be able to emulate the input-output
behaviour of another, that does not entail that any one computer has the same
representational capacity as another. An actual computer, with a finite memory,
does not have the same representational capacity as every other computer. A
computer with N bytes of memory does not have the same representational
capacity as a computer with M bytes of memory if M > N . There may be
data structures which the computer with M bytes of memory can represent,
but which the computer with N bytes cannot.
It was argued above that a computer with a finite set of states, (and hence
a finite memory), cannot perfectly represent the universe to which it belongs.
This is because a computer with a finite memory cannot code the same amount
of information as the universe to which it belongs. In general, a computer
with a finite memory cannot perfectly represent any universe which can code
a greater amount of information than the computer. Any universe which can
code a greater amount of information than the universe to which the computer
belongs, will code more information than the computer.
If one accepts Tipler’s claim that “complexity is appropriately measured by
the number of possible alternative states a system can be in,” (1995, p118), then
the complexity of a system can also be measured as the amount of information
which that system can code.9 If one accepts that a finite volume subsystem has
only a finite number of possible states, then a computer can only have a finite
memory. If a computer can only have a finite memory, then a computer cannot
perfectly represent a universe of the same complexity, or greater complexity,
than the universe to which the computer belongs. The complexity of a universe
is observable, hence, contra Tipler, the levels of implementation are distinguish-
able. If a finite volume subsystem has only a finite number of possible states,
then each higher level of universe implementation is less complex than the level
below. A computer with a finite memory cannot perfectly represent a universe
unless that universe is simpler than the universe to which the computer belongs.
The more complex the universe one belongs to, the lower down the hierarchy
that universe is placed. A universe of maximal complexity, if there is such a
thing, could be proven to be the universe of ultimate reality.
9This should not be confused with the computational complexity of an algorithm used
to calculate the values of a function. This is a measure of the growth in computation time
with the growth of the size of the input. Those functions which are computable are divided
into those which are calculable by an algorithm in polynomial time, P, and those which are
not, NP. Tipler’s notion of complexity is also distinct from the Kolmogorov complexity of an
object, which is the length, in bits, of the shortest computer program capable of producing
the digital representation of that object, as output.
29
If our universe is a computer program running on a computer in another
universe, then that universe must have a higher level of complexity to our own.
This greater complexity might take the form of a higher number of spatial di-
mensions. If the metaphysical universe has a higher number of dimensions than
our own, this would be consistent with the proposal for a projective relationship
between a metaphysical reality and a physical reality.
Of course, if a finite volume subsystem has a discrete infinity of possible
states, then a computer might be able to perfectly represent a universe with the
same complexity as the universe to which the computer belongs. If so, then the
levels of universe implementation might all have the same level of complexity.
The point is that, if the Bekenstein bound does entail that a finite volume
subsystem has only a finite number of possible states, then the Bekenstein bound
is inconsistent with the thesis that universes at different levels of implementation
are indistinguishable.
4 Reductionism, identity, and universe creation
on a computer
The suggestion that a physical system can be perfectly simulated on a computer
appears to have anti-reductionistic implications. Suppose, for example, that a
tornado could be perfectly simulated on a computer. A tornado is described
by a solution of the Navier-Stokes equations.10 To simulate a tornado on a
computer, one would define program variables to represent the air pressure,
velocity, density etc. in a volume of space, and one would represent the tornado
by calculating a solution of the Navier-Stokes equations for these variables.
Whilst a ‘real’ tornado is realised upon a collection of air molecules, a simulated
tornado is realised upon the components and circuitry of a computer. Hence,
if a tornado could be perfectly simulated on a computer, then a tornado could
be realised on more than one medium. Two completely different lower-level
processes would correspond to the same higher-level process.
Epistemological reductionism asserts that what can be known or theoreti-
cally represented about the higher levels of a composite system can be reduced
to what can be known or theoretically represented about the lower levels. Onto-
logical reductionism asserts that what exists on the higher levels of a composite
system can be reduced to what exists on the lower levels. I propose that onto-
logical reductionism is the conjunction of the two following assertions:
1. The higher-level properties of a composite system uniquely determine the
parts of the system and the way in which the parts are organized and
interact. In other words, the higher-level properties of a composite system
uniquely determine the properties of the subsystems and the relationships
10There is, for example, an exact solution of the Navier-Stokes equations called the Sullivan
Vortex, which describes the flow in an intense tornado with a central downdraft.
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between the subsystems.11
2. The parts of a system, and the way in which the parts are organized and
interact, uniquely determine the higher-level properties of the system. In
other words, the properties of the subsystems in a composite system, and
the relationships between the subsystems, uniquely determines the higher-
level properties of the composite system.
The second assertion on its own is ontological supervenience. This is the
idea that there can be no difference in the higher-level state of a composite
system without a difference in the lower-level state, otherwise one would have a
one-many correspondence between the lower-level states and higher-level states.
Some of the expressions used here require some explanation. A composite
system is simply a system composed of multiple parts, whilst a higher-level
property of a composite system is a property which can be possessed by the
whole system. In some cases, such as shape and size, a higher-level property
can also be possessed by the subsystems. In other cases, a higher-level property
cannot be possessed by any individual part. For example, liquidity is a higher-
level property of matter which can only be possessed by a collection of particles.
Liquidity cannot be possessed by an individual particle.
If a system satisfies some law of physics, then that law of physics is a property
of the system. If the system is a composite system, and it satisfies some law
of physics, then that law of physics is a higher-level property of the system. In
one sense, the laws of physics are properties of properties of physical systems,
or relationships between the properties of a physical system. If energy, position,
and velocity, for example, are properties of physical systems, then evolution
equations govern the time evolution of these properties, and constraint equations
govern the possible relationships between the different properties.
The claim that the laws of Nature are relationships among properties is
part of the ‘N-relation’ account of the laws of Nature. Consider the example
F = Ma. There are two levels on which this law expresses a relationship be-
tween properties. The first level relationship is between the general properties
of acceleration, force and mass. This is a relationship between so-called ‘deter-
minable’ properties. This relationship between determinable properties entails
an infinite number of other relationships between the so-called ‘determinates’ of
those properties. Determinates are more specific properties: If the property of
mass is a determinable property, then a mass of 3.0kg, or a mass of 23.7kg, are
examples of determinate properties. The general relationship F = Ma entails
an infinite number of relationships between the determinates. For example, an
acceleration of 5ms−2, a mass of 10kg, and a force of 50N, are so related. How-
ever, even a determinate property such as a mass of 3.0kg, is a universal, which
can be possessed by different objects at different times and places. One can
have many different instances of a mass of 3.0kg. Hence, on a third level, the
general law expresses a relationship between all instances of the determinates.
11Epistemological reductionism asserts that the higher-level states and properties are defin-
able in terms of the lower-level states or properties.
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The organization and interaction between the parts of a composite system
includes both the spatial arrangement of the parts, and the mutual forces exerted
between them. For example, if the parts are atoms or molecules, the properties
of the composite system depend upon whether the parts are arranged randomly
or as a crystal lattice, and depend upon whether the electromagnetic bonds
between the parts are covalent bonds, or Van de Waals bonds, etc.
Statement 1 claims that the entire set of higher-level properties, in com-
bination, determines uniquely the parts of the system and the way they are
organized and interact. Individual higher-level properties can be possessed by
many different systems, composed of different parts. For example, liquidity is
a higher-level property which can be possessed by many different chemical sub-
stances. Liquidity is not a property unique to water. A collection of helium
atoms, or mercury atoms, for example, can be in a liquid state. Hence, liquidity
is a higher-level property of a system which does not uniquely determine the
parts of the system. The parts of any liquid body do interact in a similar man-
ner, whatever the types of particle involved, hence liquidity, as a higher-level
property, does determine the type of the relationships between the parts, but
it does not determine what the parts will be. Furthermore, the specific liquid
properties, such as viscosity, density, or pressure, will be different for different
chemicals. Liquids of different chemical composition will all share the property
of liquidity, but they will differ in the complete range of higher-level properties
they possess.
If a physical system could be realised on more than one medium, this would
entail the falsity of statement 1. It would not, however, affect statement 2, the
principle of supervenience. For example, the properties of a tornado might not
determine a unique medium upon which it must be realised, but the properties of
air molecules, and the relationships between air molecules entail that a tornado
can be realised on a collection of air molecules. Similarly, if it were possible
to realise a tornado on a computer, then it would be the properties of, and
relationships between, the components and circuitry of a computer which would
entail that a tornado can be realised upon a computer.
Whether or not a physical system can in fact be realised on more than one
medium depends upon how one defines the identity of a system. In the case of
a tornado there are two possible approaches:
(a). A tornado is a physical system composed of atmospheric molecules, which
has the property that it satisfies a tornado-solution of the Navier-Stokes
equations. The identity of a tornado is inseparable from being a collection
of atmospheric molecules. Under this approach, a tornado is not realised
upon a collection of atmospheric molecules, it is composed of atmospheric
molecules. Under this approach, a tornado cannot be realised on more
than one medium because there is no sense in which a tornado is realised
on any medium. It is only if the identity of a tornado can be defined in a
formal, mathematical sense, that one can speak of a tornado being realised
upon a medium.
(b). If the identity of a tornado is defined by a solution of the Navier-Stokes
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equations, and if the identity of a solution of the Navier-Stokes equations
is independent of any particular medium, then the identity of a tornado is
independent of any particular medium. Under this approach, the identity
of a tornado is independent of its realisation upon a collection of atmo-
spheric molecules. If the components and circuitry of a computer can
realise a tornado-solution of the Navier-Stokes equations, then a tornado
can be realised on the components and circuitry of a computer.
The identity of a solution to the Navier-Stokes equations is independent of
any particular physical medium because a solution of a differential equation is
merely a mathematical object. A solution to a differential equation is given
physical meaning when the solution variables are given a physical reference
i.e. physical units. The solution variables can refer to many different things.
Consider the diverse referents of solutions to the wave equation and the diffusion
equation.
When a solution of the Navier-Stokes equations is realised on a medium,
the solution variables are given reference. When a solution of the Navier-Stokes
equations is realised on the medium of atmospheric molecules, the solution vari-
ables refer to air pressure, velocity, density etc. If a tornado could be realised on
an economic system, the solution variables would refer to economic quantities.
For a computer to be able to realise a tornado-solution of the Navier-Stokes
equations, the computer must possess physical properties which can be the ref-
erents of the solution variables for a tornado-solution. These physical properties
of the computer might well be compound or collective properties, (compared to
the possibly fundamental properties of the simulated system), but they must
be physical. If a tornado can be realised on a computer, the solution variables
do not refer to properties of the atmosphere, such as pressure, velocity, density
etc. Instead, they refer to properties of the computer components and circuitry,
such as, perhaps, the voltage states of the bytes in computer memory. The
medium upon which a solution is realised is defined by the referents assigned to
the solution variables.
A computer cannot realise a solution of the Navier-Stokes equations in which
the solution variables refer to atmospheric pressure, velocity, density etc. be-
cause a computer does not possess these quantities. A computer can only rep-
resent variables such as atmospheric pressure. There is, therefore, a subtle but
important distinction between (i) the realisation of a tornado-solution of the
Navier-Stokes equations on a computer, and (ii) the representation on a com-
puter of a realisation of a tornado-solution upon the medium of atmospheric
molecules. A computer simulation of a tornado cannot realise a tornado in the
sense of realizing a system with atmospheric pressure, velocity, density etc on
the computer.
It is possible to accept approach (b), that the identity of a tornado is in-
dependent of any particular medium, without accepting that a tornado can
be realised on a computer. A computer does not possess physical properties
which can be the referents of the solution variables for the Navier-Stokes equa-
tions. One reason is that the solution variables are continuous, whilst the logical
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states of electronic circuits are discrete. The example of a tornado-solution to
the Navier-Stokes equations is probably a bad one at this juncture because the
Navier-Stokes equations, and fluid mechanics in toto, merely provide a phe-
nomenological approximation. A tornado-solution of the Navier-Stokes equa-
tions is not exactly realised on the medium of air molecules either. However,
even if one goes down to the level of fundamental physics, a computer cannot
exactly realise solutions to the fundamental equations of physics either. The
reason is twofold:
• There is a one-many correspondence between the logical states and the
exact electronic states of circuits.
• The logical states of multiple-bits in computer memory only represent
numbers because they are deemed to do so under a numeric-interpretation.
In current computers, each bit of memory corresponds to an electrical cir-
cuit, and the two possible logical states of the bit correspond with two possible
voltages between fixed points of the circuit. A voltage-value lies on a continuum.
The logical state of 1 is not defined by a single precise voltage value, but by a
range of values. The logical state of 0 is defined by a different range of possible
voltages. There is, therefore, a one-many correspondence between logical states
and voltage levels. Successive runs of the same program will not produce exactly
the same sequence of electronic states in computer memory. The exact voltage
levels will be different on successive runs. This level of electrical noise prevents a
contemporary computer from exactly realizing anything, even discrete objects.
This suggests that a tornado-solution of the Navier-Stokes equations can
only be approximately realised on a digital computer. This is crucial to the
reductionistic question of whether the same physical system can be realised on
more than one physical medium. If there cannot be an exact realisation of a
tornado on the medium provided by the components and circuitry of a com-
puter, this is presumably because the properties of, and relationships between,
the components and circuitry of a computer differ from the properties of, and
relationships between, the air molecules in a region of the atmosphere.
The condition that a computer must possess physical properties which can
be the referents of the solution variables for a tornado solution, means that the
properties must be objective properties if a computer is to realise a tornado-
solution of the Navier-Stokes equations. Given the many-one correspondence
between exact electronic states and logical states, the exact electronic proper-
ties of a computer’s components cannot be the referents of the solution variables.
Moreover, it is the numeric interpretation of the logical states of multiple elec-
trical circuits which are the candidate properties. It is the pattern of numbers
represented by a computer which resembles the pattern of values for the physical
quantities of a simulated system. As will be explained at length, the numbers
represented by a computer are interpretation-dependent, hence the numbers rep-
resented by a computer cannot be objective properties of the computer. The ref-
erents of the solution variables must be objective, not interpretation-dependent,
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hence a computer cannot realise a tornado-solution of the Navier-Stokes equa-
tions, or any other physical system for that matter. If the numbers represented
by the computer are interpretation-dependent, then the pattern of numbers rep-
resented by the computer must be an interpretation-dependent pattern. Hence,
the resemblance between the pattern of numbers represented by the computer
and the pattern of values for the physical quantities of a simulated system must
be an interpretation-dependent resemblance.
Change the interpretation of the logical states of multiple electrical circuits,
and there is no resemblance, not even an approximate one. Even if there was
no electrical noise, and even if the simulated system was discrete itself, (even
if there was a bijective correspondence), it would still be an interpretation-
dependent resemblance. The numbers represented by the computer are not
compound physical properties of the computer.
5 A digital computer simulation of a universe
cannot exist as a universe
A digital computer simulation of a physical system cannot exist as, (does not
possess the properties and relationships of), anything else other than a physical
process occurring upon the components of a computer. In the current case
of an electronic digital computer, a simulation cannot exist as anything else
other than an electronic physical process occurring upon the components and
circuitry of a computer. The general structure of the argument which establishes
this conclusion is as follows:
1. A digital computer simulation is a type of representation.
2. There are three types of representation.
3. A digital computer simulation is a special case of the type of representation
in which there is no objective relationship between the represented thing
and the thing which represents it.
4. If there is no objective relationship between a universe and a digital com-
puter simulation of a universe, then a digital computer simulation of a
universe cannot exist as a universe.
The reasoning that justifies claim 3, outlined at the end of the previous
section, is basically as follows: In a computer simulation, the values of the
physical quantities possessed by the simulated system are represented by the
combined states of multiple bits12 in computer memory. However, the combined
states of multiple bits in computer memory only represent numbers because they
are deemed to do so under a numeric interpretation. There are many different
interpretations of the combined states of multiple bits in computer memory. If
the numbers represented by a digital computer are interpretation-dependent,
12Qubits in the case of quantum computers.
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they cannot be objective physical properties. Hence, there can be no objective
relationship between the changing pattern of multiple bit-states in computer
memory, and the changing pattern of quantity-values of a simulated physical
system.
Because a digital computer simulation of a universe cannot exist as a uni-
verse, it is, a fortiori, impossible for anyone to be embedded in a digital computer
simulation. It is impossible for our experience to be indistinguishable from the
experience of someone embedded in a digital computer simulation because it is
impossible for anyone to be embedded in a digital computer simulation.
Tipler assumes that if a universe is simulated on a computer, then the simu-
lation exists as a universe, at a so-called ‘higher level of implementation’. This
ontological assumption can be generalized to the following proposition: If a
physical system of type T is simulated on a computer, then the simulation ex-
ists as a system of type T , at a higher level of implementation. For example, if
a tornado is simulated on a computer, it could be claimed that the simulation
exists as a tornado, at a higher level of implementation. In opposition, it can be
argued that a digital computer simulation of a physical system, even a perfect
simulation, cannot exist as the thing it represents. Note, this does not entail
that there is no such thing as a simulation of a physical system. A simulation of
a physical system does exist, but it exists only as a physical process occurring
upon the hardware of the computer.
A computer simulation is a special type of representation. A current digital
computer can electronically encode numbers, and because numbers can be used
to represent physical systems, a computer can represent physical systems. A dig-
ital computer simulation of a physical system is an evolving, automated, quanti-
tative, adjustable, and encoded description. It is most important to appreciate
that a digital computer simulation represents a physical system by means of an
encoded description. Mathematical physics is able to describe physical systems
in terms of numbers, and a current digital computer simulation electronically
encodes the numerical description provided by mathematical physics.
To speak of an encoded description, is not to refer to the code of a pro-
gramming language; in terms of current computer technology, it means, rather,
that the description provided by mathematical physics in terms of numbers,
undergoes a transformation into the states of electronic circuits. This transfor-
mation is an encoding transformation. To relate a computer simulation to the
physical world it is necessary to use a decoding transformation. This decoding
transformation maps the states of electronic circuits back into numbers.
The description provided by mathematical physics is itself a type of represen-
tation of the physical world. A current digital computer simulation represents
a physical system by electronically encoding the numerical representation pro-
vided by mathematical physics.
A representation is defined by a mapping f which specifies the correspon-
dence between the represented thing and the thing which represents it. An
object, or the state of an object, can be represented in two different ways:
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1. If an object/state is a structured entityM , it can provide the entire domain
of a mapping f :M → f(M) which defines the representation. The range
of the mapping, f(M), is also a structured entity. The mapping f is a
homomorphism with respect to some level of structure possessed by M
and f(M).
2. An object/state can be an element x ∈ M in the domain of a mapping
f :M → f(M) which defines the representation.
The representation of a Formula One car by a wind-tunnel model is an exam-
ple of type-1 representation. The representation of a number by the electronic
state of a word13 of memory in a current digital computer, is an example of
type-2 representation.
In the example of the wind-tunnel model, there is an approximate homothetic
isomorphism14 from the exterior surface of the wind-tunnel model to the exterior
surface of the actual Formula One car. This notion of structure preservation
can be seen in other cases of representation. The notorious map of the London
Underground does not preserve geometry, but it does preserve the topology of
the network. Hence, there is a homeomorphic isomorphism involved.
There is no homomorphism between a number and the electronic state of a
word of computer memory. Each number is merely an element in the domain of
a mapping which maps numbers to the electronic states of a word of computer
memory. There are many ways to represent a number by the state of a word of
computer memory. Moreover, the same electronic states of a word in computer
memory can represent things other than numbers; they can represent character
symbols, or parts of images and sounds.
Type-2 representation has two sub-types. The mapping f :M → f(M) can
be defined by either (2i) an objective, causal physical process, or by (2ii) the
decisions of thinking-beings.
The primary example of type-2i representation is the representation of the
external world by brain states. Taking the example of visual perception, there
is no homomorphism between the spatial geometry of an individual’s visual
field, and the state of the neuronal network in that part of the brain which
deals with vision. However, the correspondence between brain states and the
external world is not an arbitrary mapping. It is a correspondence defined by a
causal physical process involving photons of light, the human eye, the retina, and
the human brain. The correspondence exists independently of human decision-
making.
The different types of representation proposed above are similar to C.S.
Peirce’s tripartite division of representational ‘signs’ into ‘icons’, ‘indices’, and
‘symbols’. Peirce held that icons resemble what they represent, indices are
causally connected to what they represent, and symbols are arbitrary labels for
what they represent, (see Schwartz 1995, p536-537).
13A word is four consecutive bytes.
14A transformation which changes only the scale factor.
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Type-1 and type-2i representation both involve objective facts, but type-2ii
representation does not. It is an objective fact about the wind-tunnel model
that it is approximately homothetically isomorphic to the actual Formula One
car. The relationship between brain states and the states of the external world,
exists objectively because it is determined by an objective physical process.
However, type-2ii representation does not involve objective facts because the
correspondence is neither homomorphic, nor is it a causal correspondence.
If a thing is merely an element x in the domain of a representational mapping
f which maps x to another thing f(x) = y, then x can be mapped to things
with which it shares no characteristics. Typically, there exist other representa-
tional mappings {gi}, for which x is again merely an element in their respective
domains, and which map x to things {gi(x) = zi} which either share none of
the characteristics of y, or which possess characteristics mutually exclusive to
those possessed by y.
In contrast, if a thing is the entire domain M of a representational mapping
F , which maps M , at some level of homomorphy, to another thing, F (M) =
N , then any other object to which M can be mapped at the same level of
homomorphy, must also be homomorphic to N . If G :M → P is a homomorphic
mapping, then F ◦G−1 : P → N must also be a homomorphic mapping. Despite
this,M can still be represented by things with mutually exclusive characteristics.
For example, a torus can be represented by a red coffee cup, and a torus can be
represented by a blue coffee cup. A torus is isomorphic to both coffee cups at
the level of a topological isomorphism, but a coffee cup cannot be both red and
blue in colour. As another example, a triangle is homeomorphic to a circle and
homeomorphic to a square, yet the problems of squaring a circle are well-known!
The point, however, is that F (M) and G(M) must share some characteristics,
the ones which are preserved by the homomorphic mappings. In contrast, f(x)
and gi(x) might share no characteristics at all.
Consider another example of type-2ii representation. The state of a light
switch could be used to represent things other than itself. One could decide
that the On-position of a light switch represents the number 1, and the Off-
position represents the number 0. This relationship between the states of the
light switch and the set {0, 1} does not exist objectively. In other words, the
relationship does not exist independently of the interpretative decisions made
by human-beings. Someone else could decide that the On-position represents
the number 0, and that the Off-position represents the number 1. One could
even decide that the On-position of a light switch represents the colour black,
and the Off-position represents the colour white. There is no homomorphism
between the On-position of a light switch and either the number 1 or the colour
black. The position of the light switch is merely being used as an element in the
domain of a mapping which defines the representation. The state of the light
switch shares no characteristics with either the number 1 or the colour black.
In the case of a digital computer simulation, the bytes of memory are used
to represent numbers and numbers are used to represent the quantities of the
simulated system. Hence, the representation of a tornado by the electronic
states of a current digital computer is an example of type-2ii representation.
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There is no homomorphism between the electronic states of a current digital
computer and the things those states are chosen to represent. The electronic
states of a computer can be mapped to many different things, but in each case an
electronic state is merely an element in the domain of the mapping which defines
the representation.15 The electronic state of a computer is not the domain of
a homomorphic mapping, and human decisions, rather than causal processes,
determine what things the electronic states of a digital computer represent. For
these reasons, the states of a digital computer are not objectively related to that
which they are deemed to represent.
Note also that the processes occurring within the CPU of a computer are not
arithmetical or logical operations in any objective sense. The processes occur-
ring within the CPU of a computer are only arithmetical and logical operations
under a specific interpretation.
The electronic states of a current digital computer do possess quite intricate
structure, but that structure is not used for the representational applications
of a computer. The state of each bit in the memory of a computer is defined
by the 1-dimensional graph topology of an electrical circuit, and by the voltage
between specific points of the circuit. Hence, the memory-state of a computer
is something with quite intricate structure. However, this electrical circuit and
voltage structure does not resemble the things which the memory of a computer
is chosen to represent.
Note carefully that the distinction between the types of representation does
not entail that a wind-tunnel model objectively represents a Formula One car,
nor does it entail that a brain state objectively represents the spatial geometry
of an individual’s visual field. There is no such thing as objective represen-
tation. Representation is dependent upon the interpretational decisions taken
by thinking-beings. This is true for type-1, type-2i and type-2ii representation.
Whether x represents anything at all, and what type of representation it is, is
dependent upon the interpretational decisions taken by thinking beings. The
wind-tunnel model and the Formula One car are objectively related, and brain
states and visual fields are objectively related, but whether or not one represents
the other is determined by the decisions taken by thinking beings. Type-1 and
type-2i representation require objective relationships to exist. Resemblance is
not a sufficient condition of type-1 representation, but it is a necessary condi-
tion. Causal connection is not a sufficient condition for type-2i representation,
but it is a necessary condition. In contrast, type-2ii representation does not
require an objective relationship of any type between x and what it represents,
and a digital computer simulation is a type-2ii representation.
If a digital computer simulation of a universe is a type-2ii representation,
then a digital computer simulation of a universe is not objectively related to
15To be strictly accurate, one should recall that there is a one-many correspondence between
the logical states and the exact electronic states of computer memory. Although there are
bijective mappings between numbers and the logical states of words in computer memory,
there are no bijective mappings between numbers and the exact electronic states of memory.
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that universe. This rules out the claim that a digital computer simulation could
exist as a universe.
Although the states of a digital computer are not objectively related to the
things they represent, it is possible that the states of an analog computer could
be so related. It is conceivable that there could be an homomorphism between
the states of an analog computer and the things those states represent. Whilst
an analog computer does not necessarily resemble the system it represents in
terms of geometry or topology, a homomorphism between physical objects is not
necessarily a homomorphism of spatial geometry or topology. The examples of
the wind-tunnel model and London Underground map are misleading in this
respect. The homomorphism could be a non-visual homomorphism. An analog
computer could posses objective physical properties which do change with the
same pattern as the changing pattern of values for the physical quantities on a
simulated system. Hence, an analog computer simulation might provide type-1
representation. If this is so, then a more general argument would be required to
demonstrate that no type of computer simulation at all could exist as a universe.
In the examples of type-1 representation given above, although there is a
physical resemblance in some respects between M and f(M), there is not total
resemblance. For example, although the parts of a wind-tunnel model subtend
the same angles as the actual car, the wind-tunnel model is not the same size
as the actual car. However, there is no reason why a type-1 representor cannot
possess all the properties of the thing it represents. At least, there is no reason
why a type-1 representor cannot possess all the ‘intrinsic’ properties of the thing
it represents. The intrinsic properties of an object are the properties it possesses
independently of its relationships to other objects. If one object is numerically
distinct from another, as a representor must be from what it represents, then
the two objects cannot share the same set of relationships with other objects.
To be numerically distinct, they must occupy disjoint regions of space-time, and
therefore cannot share the same set of spatio-temporal relationships with other
objects.
If a type-1 representor possesses all the intrinsic properties of the thing it
represents, then one might conclude that it exists as the same type of thing as the
thing it represents. Accordingly, an analog computer simulation of a universe
might exist as a universe. However, to reiterate, it remains to be proven that
an analog computer can possess the representational capacity to represent an
entire universe.
In type-2 representation, a representor need not exist as the thing it rep-
resents because a type-2 representor need not possess any of the properties of
the thing it represents. In particular, a type-2ii representor can represent many
things, with mutually exclusive properties. If a type-2ii representor were to al-
ways exist as that which it represents, it would exist as many different things,
a contradiction. A digital computer simulation, even a perfect simulation, is a
special case of type-2ii representation. A current digital computer simulation
of a tornado exists as an electronic process the computer undergoes, not as a
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tornado. Similarly, a current digital computer simulation of an entire universe
exists as an electronic process the computer undergoes, not as a universe.
Recall that Tipler imagines a perfect computer simulation of our universe,
which would simulate all the people who exist in our own universe. Such simu-
lated people, suggests Tipler, would reflect upon the fact that they think, would
interact with their apparent environment, and would conclude that they exist.
The claim that a simulated universe would be real to the simulated people, pre-
supposes that simulated people exist. Digital computer simulations of people
exist only as physical processes on a computer, not as people. Hence, there are
no people in a digital computer simulation to reflect upon the fact that they
think, or to interact with their apparent environment.
If a perfect digital computer simulation of a universe cannot exist as a uni-
verse, then Tipler’s sceptical hypothesis cannot be true. It is impossible that
our own experience is indistinguishable from the experience of somebody em-
bedded in a digital computer simulation because it is impossible for anybody to
be embedded in a digital computer simulation. People cannot exist in digital
computer simulations.
There is a similarity between the argument above, and one of John Searle’s
arguments against the claim of ‘Strong’ Artificial Intelligence (Strong AI), that
minds are computer programs. Searle argues that the brain cannot be a com-
puter in any objective sense because nothing can be a computer in an objective
sense. Searle argues that a process cannot be a computational process in any ob-
jective sense. He claims that “A process is computational only relative to some
observer or user who assigns a computational interpretation to it,” (Searle 1995,
p548). In terms of what exists and what happens independently of observers,
Searle states that a computer “is an electronic circuit with state transitions be-
tween voltage levels,” (ibid., p547). The devices we refer to as computers can
only be said to undergo computational processes because that is the interpreta-
tion which the designers and users assign to them.
If the brain cannot be a computer in any objective sense, then the mind
cannot be a computer program running on the brain, in any objective sense.
Analogously, one can argue that a computer simulation is only a simulation
because it is deemed so by the designers and users of the simulation. Our
universe cannot be a computer simulation (program) in any objective sense
because nothing can be a computer simulation (program) in any objective sense.
Nothing can be a computer simulation (program) independently of our beliefs
about it. A simulation of a system does not exist as the simulated system in any
objective sense; rather, it is the electronic states and processes of the computer
which exist. As Searle points out, a computer can “simulate the formal features
of any process,” but “the fact that the programmer and the interpreter of the
computer output use the symbols to stand for objects in the world is totally
beyond the scope of the computer,” (Searle 1982, p370).
The fact that a simulation does not exist in any objective sense follows from
the fact that representation is not an objective relationship between objects.
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However, as emphasised, objective relationships do exist between objects, and
there may be objective relationships between analog computers and the physical
systems they simulate which enables an analog computer simulation to exist as
the type of system it represents.
The things represented in a digital computer simulation do not exist in the
memory of the computer; nothing exists other than the processes occurring to
the components of the computer.
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